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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant, Dr. W. Channing Nicholas, was fired from his 
tenured professorship at Pennsylvania State University 
following a series of run-ins with his new supervisor, Dr. 
William Evans. Nicholas brought suit against the University 
and Evans alleging, inter alia, violation of procedural and 
substantive due process, retaliatory firing in violation of the 
First Amendment, and breach of contract. The District 
Court determined that the University had breached 
Nicholas's tenure contract, but entered judgment in favor of 
the defendants on all other counts. 
 
Nicholas raises a host of substantive and procedural 
arguments on appeal. Most importantly, he claims that his 
tenured professorship was a property interest entitled to 
protection under the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause. Because we find that this argument--like 
Nicholas's other grounds for appeal--is without merit, we 
will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In 1966, Nicholas was named Associate Professor of 
Physiology at Pennsylvania State University's Noll Human 
Performance Laboratory. After receiving tenure in 1973, 
Nicholas supplemented his income with various outside 
jobs, including work as an emergency room physician for 
Centre Emergency Medical Associates. The University 
claims that Nicholas worked full-time in the emergency 
room and consequently was unable to work regular hours 
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at Noll Lab. Nicholas disputes this, claiming that his 
emergency room work was only part-time. 
 
In July 1993, the University hired Evans as the new 
director of Noll Lab. On his arrival, Evans--who was now 
Nicholas's supervisor--requested that Nicholas provide him 
with information about his curriculum vitae and research 
plans, as well as a written schedule for his work at Noll 
Lab. In particular, Evans requested an assurance that 
Nicholas would maintain a full-time presence with regular 
hours at the Lab--a concern he claims was raised by 
Nicholas's outside work. Nicholas was not forthcoming with 
this information. 
 
On several occasions during the next few months, Evans 
provided Nicholas with written warnings, stating that 
Nicholas had jeopardized his position with the University by 
refusing to provide the requested information. At a meeting 
on May 10, 1994, Evans formally notified Nicholas that he 
would be terminated if he did not respond to Evans's 
requests. Nicholas refused to provide any assurance at that 
meeting, or at another meeting with Dr. Peter Farrell, that 
he would work full-time hours at the Lab. On May 20, 
1994, several members of the Noll Lab facility wrote to 
Dean Herbert A. Lundegren to express their concern that 
Nicholas could no longer provide medical coverage for their 
research efforts. On June 17, 1994, Evans handed Nicholas 
his termination letter. 
 
According to Nicholas, Evans's charges of 
insubordination were merely a pretext. In reality, Nicholas 
alleges, his termination was the consequence of a personal 
vendetta waged against him by Evans, which was prompted 
in part by Nicholas's objections to Evans's research 
methods. Prior to his termination, Nicholas had contacted 
the State Board of Medicine to complain about Evans's 
proposal to have non-medical personnel perform muscle 
biopsies independent of any medical supervision. The 
University subsequently adopted Nicholas's position and 
directed that the muscle biopsies be performed only by 
medical personnel. 
 
Nicholas appealed his termination. The University 
provided him with a detailed statement of charges, and the 
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University's Standing Joint Committee on Tenure held a full 
hearing in January 1995. Nicholas was represented by 
counsel at the hearing, and had an opportunity to call 
witnesses and cross-examine the University's witnesses. 
The Committee found that three of the five charges lodged 
against Nicholas by the University constituted adequate 
cause for terminating his tenure. Based on the Committee's 
findings, the President of the University upheld Nicholas's 
termination. Following his termination, Nicholas worked 
full-time as a doctor at area hospitals, making more in 
money and benefits than before his termination. 
 
In June 1997, Nicholas filed this lawsuit against the 
University and Evans. In his five-count Complaint, he 
alleged that the defendants' actions: (1) violated his rights 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment; (2) violated these same rights and 
discriminated against Nicholas based on his age in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. S 1983; (3) violated the Pennsylvania 
whistleblower law, 43 P.S.A. S 1423; (4) constituted a 
breach of his tenure contract; and (5) violated ERISA. 
 
The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the 
District Court dismissed Counts I and V of the Complaint, 
as well as Count II's S 1983 claims based on age 
discrimination and substantive due process. The case was 
bifurcated and the liability phase proceeded to jury trial. At 
the close of Nicholas's case, the District Court granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss Count III, alleging violation of 
the whistleblower law. 
 
At the close of the liability phase, the jury returned a 
special verdict that read as follows: 
 
       1) Prior to Plaintiff 's termination, did Defendants fail to 
       provide Plaintiff with oral or written notice of the 
       charges against him and an opportunity to present his 
       side of the story? 
 
         Answer: No 
 
       2) After Plaintiff 's termination, did the University fail to 
       provide Plaintiff with a fair hearing on the charges 
       against him? 
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         Answer: Yes 
 
       3) Was Plaintiff 's report on Dr. Evans' muscle biopsy 
       procedures to the State Board of Medicine a 
       substantial or motivating factor in Defendant's decision 
       to terminate Plaintiff? 
 
         Answer: Yes 
 
       4) If Plaintiff had not filed a report on Dr. Evans with 
       the State Board of Medicine, would Defendants' 
       decision to terminate Plaintiff have been the same? 
 
         Answer: Yes 
 
       5) Did the University breach the terms of its tenure 
       contract with Plaintiff by terminating him? 
 
         Answer: Yes 
 
(App. 305-310.) 
 
The defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on questions 2 and 5. The District Court granted 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on 
question 2, the post-termination procedural due process 
claim. The court also entered final judgment in favor of the 
University as to the First Amendment claim and in favor of 
Evans as to all claims. The remaining breach of contract 
claim against the University went to the jury for 
determination of damages. 
 
Prior to the damages phase, the District Court granted 
the University's motion for discovery sanctions against 
Nicholas, precluding him from introducing evidence of 
future lost earnings. The court also excluded evidence 
related to punitive damages, detrimental reliance and 
compensatory damages beyond lost earnings and benefits. 
At the conclusion of the damages phase, the jury entered 
the following special verdict: 
 
       Question No. 1: Did Dr. Nicholas suffer any actual 
       damages causally related to the University's breach of 
       contract? 
 
         Answer: No. 
 
       . . . . 
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       Question No. 3: If your answer to Question No. 1 is 
       "No" or "Evidence Equally Balanced," what amount of 
       nominal damages do you award? 
 
         Answer: $1,000. 
 
(App. 614-17.) After further briefing, the District Court 
issued an order holding that: (1) Nicholas was entitled to 
severance pay in the amount of one year's salary; (2) the 
jury's award of nominal damages be reduced to $1.00; and 
(3) Nicholas was not entitled to specific performance as a 
remedy for breach of contract. Nicholas now appeals. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343 and 
1367. We have appellate jurisdiction over the final 
judgment of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
III. 
 
Nicholas raises numerous arguments on appeal. Thefirst 
five are substantive and allege that: (1) the District Court 
erred in dismissing the substantive due process claim; (2) 
the court erred in granting final judgment against him on 
the First Amendment claim; (3) the jury's verdict for 
defendants on the pre-termination procedural due process 
claim was not supported by the evidence; (4) the court 
erred in granting final judgment in favor of Evans on all 
counts; and (5) the jury charge on breach of contract was 
in error. Next, Nicholas raises three arguments relating to 
the damages phase: (6) the court erred in reducing 
Nicholas's nominal damage award; (7) the court erred in 
denying specific performance; and (8) the court erred in 
limiting Nicholas's damages to lost compensation. Finally, 
Nicholas raises three evidentiary and trial-related 
arguments: (9) the District Court improperly limited 
Nicholas's time for cross-examining Evans; (10) the court 
erred in excluding the testimony of William Becker on the 
subject of Evans's credibility; and (11) the court erred in 
granting the University's motion for discovery sanctions and 
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prohibiting Nicholas from presenting any evidence of future 
lost earnings. We will address these arguments in turn. 
 
A. 
 
Nicholas claims that defendants violated the substantive 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause by firing him for an arbitrary, irrational, or improper 
reason. The chief issue in the appeal concerns whether 
Nicholas's property interest in his tenured professorship 
was entitled to substantive due process protection. We hold 
that it was not, and accordingly affirm the District Court's 
dismissal of his substantive due process claim. 
 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." While on 
its face this constitutional provision speaks to the adequacy 
of state procedures, the Supreme Court has held that the 
clause also has a substantive component. See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
846-47 (1992) ("it is settled that the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of 
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure") 
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
 
As this Court has previously observed, substantive due 
process "is an area of law `famous for controversy, and not 
known for its simplicity.' " DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 
1987)). Part of this conceptual confusion may arise from 
the fact that the fabric of substantive due process, as 
woven by our courts, encompasses at least two very 
different threads. Before ruling on Nicholas's claim, then, 
we will attempt to untwist this tangled skein. 
 
The first thread of substantive due process applies when 
a plaintiff challenges the validity of a legislative act.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It is crucial to keep in mind the distinction between legislative acts 
and non-legislative or executive acts. As we have previously explained, 
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Typically, a legislative act will withstand substantive due 
process challenge if the government "identifies a legitimate 
state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude 
was served by the statute," although legislative acts that 
burden certain "fundamental" rights may be subject to 
stricter scrutiny. Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 
1403 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sammon v. New Jersey Bd. of 
Med. Examiners, 66 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 
The second thread of substantive due process, as 
identified by this Court, protects against certain types of 
non-legislative state action. Of course, the Due Process 
Clause's primary protection against the arbitrary exercise of 
power by government officials is its requirement of fair 
procedures--that is, of procedural due process. This Court 
has nevertheless held that a non-legislative government 
deprivation "that comports with procedural due process 
may still give rise to a substantive due process claim `upon 
allegations that the government deliberately and arbitrarily 
abused its power.' " Independent Enters. Inc. v. Pittsburgh 
Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1179 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 
F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also Boyanowski v. 
Capital Area Intermediate Unit, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 
768775, *3 (3d Cir. June 14, 2000) ("The substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause limits what 
governments may do regardless of the fairness of 
procedures that it employs, and covers government conduct 
in both legislative and executive capacities."). Accordingly, 
we have held that a property interest that falls within the 
ambit of substantive due process may not be taken away by 
the state for reasons that are "arbitrary, irrational, or 
tainted by improper motive," Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. 
Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bello 
v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988)), or by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"[e]xecutive acts, such as employment decisions, typically apply to one 
person or to a limited number of persons, while legislative acts, 
generally 
laws and broad executive regulations, apply to large segments of 
society." Homar v. Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009, 1027 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also McKinney v. Pate, 20 
F.3d 1550, 1557 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994). 
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means of government conduct so egregious that it"shocks 
the conscience," Boyanowski, 2000 WL 768775, at *4 
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 
(1998)). 
 
To prevail on a non-legislative substantive due process 
claim, "a plaintiff must establish as a threshold matter that 
he has a protected property interest to which the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection applies." 
Woodwind Estates, 205 F.3d at 123. The text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property" without 
qualification, and it is well-settled that state-created 
property interests, including some contract rights, are 
entitled to protection under the procedural component of 
the Due Process Clause. See Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 
239, 243 (3d Cir. 1989). However, "not all property interests 
worthy of procedural due process protection are protected 
by the concept of substantive due process." Id. Rather, to 
state a substantive due process claim, "a plaintiff must 
have been deprived of a particular quality of property 
interest." DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 
592, 598 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
 
On past occasion, we have lamented that "the case law of 
this circuit and the Supreme Court provides very little 
guidance as to what constitutes this `certain quality' of 
property interest worthy of protection under the substantive 
due process clause." Homar v. Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009, 1021 
(3d Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 520 
U.S. 924 (1997). Nevertheless, we believe that a careful 
review of the case law does reveal one guiding principle: 
whether a certain property interest embodies this 
"particular quality" is not determined by reference to state 
law, but rather depends on whether that interest is 
"fundamental" under the United States Constitution. See 
Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring); Independent Enters. Inc. v. 
Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1179 n.12 
(3d Cir. 1997); Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 
(10th Cir. 1995); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 
(11th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 
958 F.2d 1339, 1351 (6th Cir. 1992); Huang v. Board of 
Governors of Univ. of North Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134, 1142 
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n.10 (4th Cir. 1990); Homar v. Gilbert, 63 F. Supp. 2d 559, 
570-77 (M.D. Pa. 1999). Justice Powell explained this 
distinction in his Ewing concurrence: 
 
       Even if one assumes the existence of a property right 
       . . . not every such right is entitled to the protection of 
       substantive due process. While property interests are 
       protected by procedural due process even though the 
       interest is derived from state law rather than the 
       Constitution, substantive due process rights are 
       created only by the Constitution. 
 
       The history of substantive due process "counsels 
       caution and restraint." The determination that a 
       substantive due process right exists is a judgment that 
       " `certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny 
       of the state needs asserted to justify their 
       abridgment.' " In the context of liberty interests, this 
       Court has been careful to examine each asserted 
       interest to determine whether it "merits" the protection 
       of substantive due process. "Each new claim to 
       [substantive due process] protection must be 
       considered against a background of Constitutional 
       purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and 
       historically developed." 
 
       The interest asserted by respondent [in continued 
       university enrollment] is essentially a state-law 
       contract right. It bears little resemblance to the 
       fundamental interests that previously have been viewed 
       as implicitly protected by the Constitution. It certainly 
       is not closely tied to "respect for the teachings of 
       history, solid recognition of the basic values that 
       underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great 
       roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of 
       powers have played in establishing and preserving 
       American freedoms." For these reasons, briefly 
       summarized, I do not think the fact that Michigan may 
       have labeled this interest "property" entitles it to join 
       those other, far more important interests that have 
       heretofore been accorded the protection of substantive 
       due process 
 
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229-30 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
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Following Justice Powell, this Circuit has adopted an 
approach to substantive due process that focuses on the 
nature of the property interest at stake. By way of 
illustration, we have so far limited non-legislative 
substantive due process review to cases involving real 
property ownership. See, e.g., DeBlasio , 53 F.3d at 600 
("[land] ownership is a property interest worthy of 
substantive due process protection"). As one court has 
aptly observed, this is unquestionably "a fundamental 
property interest dating back to the foundation of the 
American colonies." Homar, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 577. And, as 
we concluded in DeBlasio, "one would be hard-pressed to 
find a property interest more worthy of substantive due 
process protection than [land] ownership." 53 F.3d at 601. 
 
Heedful of the Supreme Court's admonition that we 
should exercise "utmost care whenever we are asked to 
break new ground in this field," Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992), we have been reluctant 
to extend substantive due process protection to other, less 
fundamental property interests. In Reich v. Beharry, for 
example, we held that a service contract with the state 
failed to merit substantive due process protection. See 883 
F.2d at 245. Reich relied on this Court's previous decision 
in Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1988), which 
held that a state-law entitlement to water and sewer 
services was not protected by the Due Process Clause's 
substantive component: 
 
       Substantive due process refers to and protects federal 
       rights. The provision of water and sewer services, 
       whether by a municipality or by a private utility 
       company, is not, however, a federally protected right. 
       The legal fact that, once a municipality (or, for that 
       matter, a private utility company) establishes a utility 
       for its citizens, a citizen's expectation of receiving that 
       service rises to the level of a property interest 
       cognizable under the Due Process Clause, merely 
       brings that expectation within the compass of the 
       Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection. . . . It 
       does not transform that expectation into a substantive 
       guarantee against the state in any circumstance. 
 
Ransom, 848 F.2d at 411-12. As the Reich  court reasoned, 
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       It is apparent that, in this circuit at least, not all 
       property interests worthy of procedural due process 
       protection are protected by the concept of substantive 
       due process. Moreover, we know from Ransom 
       specifically that, despite the importance of utility 
       service to the maintenance of a minimally acceptable 
       standard of living, an arbitrary and capricious 
       termination of such service by a state actor does not 
       give rise to a substantive due process claim. 
 
       We believe it follows a fortiori from the holding in 
       Ransom that Reich's complaint fails to state a 
       substantive due process claim. As we have noted, the 
       only interest that Reich had at stake before Beharry 
       was his interest in avoiding delay in the receipt of 
       payment of a bill for professional services rendered. We 
       can think of no basis for according substantive due 
       process protection to this interest while denying it to 
       those who have had their utility service terminated. 
 
Reich, 883 F.3d at 244-45. 
 
Other cases have made explicit the requirement that a 
property interest must be constitutionally "fundamental" in 
order to implicate substantive due process. In Mauriello v. 
University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 781 F.2d 
46 (3d Cir. 1986), this Court, citing Justice Powell's 
concurrence in Ewing, opined that a graduate student's 
interest in continued academic enrollment "bore`little 
resemblance to the fundamental interests that previously 
had been viewed as implicitly protected by the 
Constitution.' " Id. at 50 (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229 
(Powell, J., concurring)).  And, in Independent Enterprises 
Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Authority, we held that a 
low bidder's entitlement to state contract "is not the sort of 
`fundamental' interest entitled to the protection of 
substantive due process." 103 F.3d at 1179. Distinguishing 
earlier cases containing "language indicating that 
substantive due process is violated whenever a 
governmental entity deliberately or arbitrarily abuses 
government power," the Independent Enterprises court 
explained that 
 
       all of the cases involved zoning decisions, building 
       permits, or other governmental permission required for 
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       some intended use of land owned by the plaintiffs, 
       matters which were recognized in DeBlasio as 
       implicating the "fundamental" property interest in the 
       ownership of land. Thus, in light of the court's explicit 
       statement in DeBlasio that some "particular quality of 
       property interest" must be infringed before substantive 
       due process protection may be invoked, these cases 
       cannot be understood as affording substantive due 
       process protection from every arbitrary and irrational 
       governmental act, but only for those that deprive the 
       plaintiff of a fundamental property right "implicitly 
       protected by the Constitution." 
 
Independent Enters., 103 F.3d at 1179 n.12 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
To summarize: when a plaintiff challenges the validity of 
a legislative act, substantive due process typically demands 
that the act be rationally related to some legitimate 
government purpose. In contrast, when a plaintiff 
challenges a non-legislative state action (such as an 
adverse employment decision), we must look, as a threshold 
matter, to whether the property interest being deprived is 
"fundamental" under the Constitution. If it is, then 
substantive due process protects the plaintiff from arbitrary 
or irrational deprivation, regardless of the adequacy of 
procedures used. If the interest is not "fundamental," 
however, the governmental action is entirely outside the 
ambit of substantive process and will be upheld so long as 
the state satisfies the requirements of procedural due 
process. 
 
With this framework in mind, we turn to whether 
Nicholas's tenured public employment is a fundamental 
property interest entitled to substantive due process 
protection. We hold that it is not, and thereby join the great 
majority of courts of appeals that have addressed this 
issue. See Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 425-26 (8th Cir. 
1999) (en banc) ("a public employee's interest in continued 
employment with a governmental employer is not so 
`fundamental' as to be protected by substantive due 
process"); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 
1994) (en banc) ("employment rights are not `fundamental' 
rights created by the Constitution"); Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. 
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of Educ., 958 F.2d 1339, 1350 (6th Cir. 1992) ("plaintiffs' 
state-created right to tenured employment lacks 
substantive due process protection"); Huang v. Board of 
Governors of Univ. of North Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134, 1142 
n.10 (4th Cir. 1990) (professor's interest in position in 
university department "is essentially a state law contract 
right, not a fundamental interest embodied in the 
Constitution"); see also Local 342, Long Island Public Serv. 
Employees v. Town Bd. of Huntington, 31 F.3d 1191, 1196 
(2d Cir. 1994) ("We do not think, however, that simple, 
state-law contractual rights, without more, are worthy of 
substantive due process protection."); Kauth v. Hartford Ins. 
Co. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1988) ("In cases 
where the plaintiff complains that he has been 
unreasonably deprived of a state-created property interest 
. . . the plaintiff has not stated a substantive due process 
claim."); Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 
1989) (finding "no clearly established constitutional right to 
substantive due process protection of continued public 
employment" in Ninth Circuit as of 1984); but see Newman 
v. Massachusetts, 884 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1989) ("school 
authorities who make an arbitrary and capricious decision 
significantly affecting a tenured teacher's employment 
status are liable for a substantive due process violation"). 
 
Nicholas's tenured public employment is a wholly state- 
created contract right; it bears little resemblance to other 
rights and property interests that have been deemed 
fundamental under the Constitution. We agree with the 
analysis of the District Court in Homar v. Gilbert that "it 
cannot be reasonably maintained that public employment is 
a property interest that is deeply rooted in the Nation's 
history and traditions. Nor does public employment 
approach the interests " `implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty" like personal choice in matters of marriage and 
family.' " 63 F. Supp. 2d at 576 (citation omitted); see also 
Collins, 503 U.S. at 128 ("state law, rather than the Federal 
Constitution, governs the substance of the employment 
relationship"). Accordingly, we view public employment as 
more closely analogous to those state-created property 
interests that this Court has previous deemed unworthy of 
substantive due process2 than to the venerable common- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See Independent Enters., 103 F.3d at 1180 (low bidder's entitlement to 
a state construction contract); Reich, 883 F.2d at 243-44 (contractor's 
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law rights of real property ownership implicated in 
DeBlasio. 
 
Our decision also comports with the Supreme Court's 
admonition that the federal judiciary should not become a 
general court of review for state employment decisions: 
 
       The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which 
       to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are 
       made daily by public agencies. We must accept the 
       harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are 
       inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our 
       affairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly 
       be construed to require federal judicial review for every 
       such error. . . . The Due Process Clause of the 
       Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against 
       incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions. 
 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1976). Therefore, we 
will affirm the District Court's entry of judgment in favor of 
the defendants on Nicholas's substantive due process claim.3 
 
B. 
 
At trial, Nicholas argued that defendants fired him in 
retaliation for his statements to state authorities criticizing 
Evans's research methods, in violation of the First 
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. On appeal, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
right to payment for services rendered to the state); Ransom, 848 F.2d 
at 411-12 (tenant's state law entitlement to sewer and water services); 
and Mauriello, 781 F.2d at 50 (graduate student's interest in continued 
studies at a state university). 
 
3. Nicholas makes some effort to argue that his case should be treated 
differently from a "garden-variety" public employment claim because it 
implicates issues of academic freedom that touch upon the First 
Amendment. We are unconvinced. The Supreme Court has recognized an 
independent S 1983 action for retaliatory termination in violation of the 
First Amendment, see Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274 (1977), and "claims governed by explicit constitutional text may 
not be grounded in substantive due process." Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 
F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Sabatini v. Reinstein, 76 F. Supp. 
2d 597, 598-99 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (First Amendment claim does not 
implicate substantive due process). 
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Nicholas contends that the District Court erred when it 
entered final judgment against him on this First 
Amendment claim. The jury made three findings relevant to 
this question: first, that the University breached Nicholas's 
tenure contract; second, that Nicholas's report on Evans's 
muscle biopsy procedures was a "substantial or motivating 
factor" in the University's termination decision; and third, 
that the University's decision would have been the same 
even if Nicholas had not filed the muscle biopsy report. The 
District Court, applying the First Amendment analysis set 
forth in Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274 (1977), held that, based on these special verdicts, 
Nicholas had failed to prevail on his First Amendment 
claim. We will affirm. 
 
Mount Healthy sets out a burden-shifting framework for 
First Amendment retaliation claims under S 1983: 
 
       In a First Amendment retaliation case, the plaintiff has 
       the initial burden of showing that his constitutionally 
       protected conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating 
       factor" in the relevant decision. Once the plaintiff 
       carries this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant 
       to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
       would have reached the same decision even in the 
       absence of the protected conduct." 
 
Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287) (citations 
omitted). If the employer shows that it would have taken 
the same action even absent the protected conduct, this 
will "defeat plaintiff 's claim." Green v. Philadelphia Housing 
Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1997). The Mount Healthy 
Court explained the rationale for this affirmative defense: 
 
       A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether 
       protected conduct played a part, "substantial" or 
       otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an 
       employee in a better position as a result of the exercise 
       of constitutionally protected conduct than he would 
       have occupied had he done nothing. . . . The 
       constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently 
       vindicated if such employee is placed in no worse a 
       position than if he had not engaged in the conduct. 
 
                                16 
  
Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285. Here, based on the jury's 
special verdict, the District Court concluded that the 
University had established this affirmative defense and 
entered judgment in its favor on the First Amendment 
claim. 
 
Nicholas raises two arguments. First, he claims that 
because the jury found that the University breached 
Nicholas's tenure contract, the District Court should have 
inferred that the termination was based solely on 
illegitimate reasons. We disagree. The jury's finding may 
reflect the factfinder's view that the University terminated 
Nicholas for some reason unrelated to Nicholas's speech 
activity (for example, for insubordination or failure to 
comply with Evans's requests) but that this reason did not 
constitute "adequate cause" under the terms of the tenure 
contract. Or it might reflect a determination that Nicholas's 
termination was justified, but that the University failed to 
observe its own rules regarding notice or severance pay. In 
either case, the reason for Nicholas's termination would not 
be pretextual or illegitimate, but would simply constitute 
breach of contract rather than a constitutional violation. 
 
Nicholas counters, however, that the jury's special 
verdicts were at least ambiguous, and that the District 
Court erred in not submitting an instruction on pretext. In 
support of this claim, he cites St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), which set forth the standard to 
be used in "dual motives" cases under Title VII. This 
argument misses the point. First Amendment retaliation 
cases are not governed by Title VII's burden-shifting 
analysis, but rather by Mount Healthy framework. In that 
case, the Supreme Court made it crystal clear that an 
employee may not recover in a dual-motives case if the 
employer shows that it would have taken the same action 
even absent the protected speech. As the Seventh Circuit 
has noted, Title VII concepts have no applicability in the 
First Amendment context: 
 
       The district court's conclusion that when protected 
       speech is a "motivating factor" what would have 
       happened in the absence of that speech is "not 
       germane to the question of liability" is . . . untenable. 
       The district court may have confused the standards Mt. 
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       Healthy establishes for constitutional litigation with the 
       standards in some other kinds of employment 
       litigation. Whatever may be the case under labor and 
       civil rights statutes, Mt. Healthy establishes the 
       approach for litigation under the first amendment. 
 
Goodan v. Neil, 17 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted).  Because the jury found that the University had 
established its affirmative defense under Mount Healthy, we 
affirm the District Court's judgment for defendants on 
Nicholas's First Amendment claims. 
 
C. 
 
Nicholas next challenges the jury's finding against him on 
his pretermination procedural due process claim, claiming 
that it was not supported by the evidence. However, 
Nicholas never made a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a 
matter of law following the jury verdict. "Where a party has 
failed to move for j.n.o.v., we will not review the sufficiency 
of the evidence and direct a verdict for them." Charles 
Jaquin et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc.,  921 F.2d 467, 
475 (3d Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we hold that Nicholas has 
waived this argument. 
 
D. 
 
Next, Nicholas contends that the District Court erred in 
granting final judgment in favor of defendant Evans on the 
breach of contract claim. We find no error here. Nicholas 
never alleges that he had any contractual relationship with 
Evans, and under Pennsylvania law, in the absence of such 
a relationship, Evans cannot be liable for breach of 
contract. See Bleday v. Oum Group, 645 A.2d 1358, 1363 
(Pa. Super. 1994). 
 
E. 
 
Nicholas challenges the following portion of the District 
Court's jury instruction in the liability phase: 
 
       When a employee asserts that an employer's policy 
       creates a contractual term between an employer and 
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       an employee, it is not sufficient to show merely that the 
       employer had a policy. The employer must show that 
       the employer offered the terms of the policy as binding 
       terms of employment. Unless the employer 
       communicates that policy as part of a definite offer of 
       employment, the employer is free to change his policy 
       such as events may require. Thus, an employer's 
       voluntary adherence to guidelines or policies affecting 
       the employment relationship does not give rise to 
       enforceable contract rights on the employee. Some 
       administrative provisions in the personnel policy 
       manual did not rise to the level of agreement by which 
       an employer must abide. 
 
       In order to provide an enforceable contract in which an 
       employer grants a specific benefit to an employee, the 
       employee must prove that the employer communicated 
       an intentional offer with definite terms, that the 
       employer intended to be bound by the offer, and that 
       the employer made the offer to induce the employee to 
       accept or continue employment with the company. 
 
(App. 1534.) Nicholas characterizes this instruction as a 
"recitation of the employment at will doctrine," which he 
claims was inappropriate in a tenure case. 
 
Contrary to Nicholas's assertions, the challenged charge 
does not address employment-at-will; rather, it sets out 
Pennsylvania law on what an employee must do in order to 
prove a disputed contractual term. As the University notes, 
such a charge was necessary because the parties, although 
agreeing that there was a tenure contract, disagreed on its 
terms. Moreover, the charge correctly stated Pennsylvania 
law: 
 
       It is not sufficient to show [the employer] had a policy. 
       It must be shown they offered it as binding terms of 
       employment. A company may indeed have a policy 
       upon which they intend to act, given certain 
       circumstances or events, but unless they communicate 
       that policy as part of a definite offer of employment 
       they are free to change as events may require. 
 
Morosetti v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. , 564 A.2d 
151, 153 (Pa. 1989). Finally, even if the charge had been in 
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error, the error would clearly be harmless: the jury found in 
Nicholas's favor on his breach of contract claim. 
 
F. 
 
Nicholas raises three objections to the District Court's 
handling of damages. First, he argues that the court erred 
in reducing the jury's award of nominal damages from 
$1,000 to one dollar; second, he claims that he was entitled 
to reinstatement to his old position at Noll Lab; and third, 
he argues that he should have been permitted to argue for 
damages arising for his alleged mental depression and for 
punitive damages. We find no merit in any of these 
contentions, and will therefore affirm. 
 
1. 
 
In Stevenson v. Economy Bank of Ambridge, 197 A.2d 721 
(Pa. 1964), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
because "the basic unit of American money is the dollar . . . 
in the future, when nominal damages are awarded in our 
courts, one dollar ($1) shall be the measure thereof." Id. at 
728. The Third Circuit has also followed this rule. See 
Mayberry v. Robinson, 427 F. Supp. 297, 314 (M.D. Pa. 
1977) ("It is clear that the rule of law in the Third Circuit 
is that nominal damages may not exceed $1.00.") (citing 
United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 830 
(3d Cir. 1976)). Accordingly, the District Court did not err 
in reducing the jury's nominal damages award to one 
dollar. 
 
2. 
 
Nor did the District Court err in refusing to order 
reinstatement. The sole basis for the University's liability 
was contractual, and under Pennsylvania law, "a court of 
equity will not grant specific performance of a contract for 
personal services." McMenamin v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 
51 A.2d 702, 703 (Pa. 1947); see also Maritrans v. Pepper, 
Hamilton & Scheetz, 572 A.2d 737, 744 (Pa. Super. 1990), 
rev'd on other grounds, 602 A.2d 1277 (1992); Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts S 367(1) (1981) ("A promise to render 
 
                                20 
  
personal service will not be specifically enforced."). As the 
Restatement makes clear, this rule extends to employees 
seeking reinstatement in cases "where personal supervision 
is considered to be involved." Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, S 367, cmt. b. Accordingly, Nicholas was not 
entitled to reinstatement as a remedy for the University's 
breach of contract. 
 
3. 
 
Finally, Nicholas claims that the District Court erred in 
precluding him from arguing for compensatory damages 
arising from his alleged mental depression and for punitive 
damages. At the outset of the damages phase, defendants 
made a motion in limine to exclude all evidence of punitive 
and compensatory damages except for lost compensation. 
The District Court granted the motion, and we will affirm. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, "[i]n an employment case, the 
measure of damages is the wages which were to be paid 
less any amount actually earned or which might have been 
earned through the exercise of reasonable diligence." 
Delliponti v. DeAngelis, 681 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Pa. 1996). In 
addition, Pennsylvania generally permits a plaintiff to 
recover consequential damages for breach of contract. See 
Cavaliere v. Duff 's Business Institute, 605 A.2d 397, 401 
(Pa. Super. 1992). 
 
The only consequential injury that Nicholas alleges, 
however, is that he was "depressed as a result of the . . . 
University's actions." Under Pennsylvania law, to recover for 
mental anguish in a breach of contract case, "plaintiffs 
must allege physical injury or physical impact." Kutner v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 553, 559 (E.D. Pa. 
1981); see also Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc. , 326 F. Supp. 
1331, 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("The mental suffering alleged 
by plaintiffs does not constitute a proper element of 
damages under Pennsylvania law."); Rittenhouse Regency 
Affiliates v. Passen, 482 A.2d 1042, 1043 (Pa. Super. 1984) 
("damages for emotional distress are not ordinarily allowed 
in actions for breach of contract"); Gefter v. Rosenthal, 119 
A.2d 250 (Pa. 1956). Nicholas has not done so. Because 
Nicholas's alleged depression was not compensable under 
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Pennsylvania law, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding this evidence. 
 
Moreover, under Pennsylvania law, "punitive damages are 
not recoverable in an action solely based upon breach of 
contract." Johnson v. Hyundai Motor America , 698 A.2d 
631, 639 (Pa. Super. 1997). By the time this case reached 
the damages phase, Nicholas's sole remaining claim was for 
breach of contract; as a result, the District Court was 
correct to exclude evidence relating to punitive damages. 
 
G. 
 
We finally turn to Nicholas's evidentiary and procedural 
objections. 
 
1. 
 
At the beginning of the trial on liability (in late April), the 
District Judge informed the parties that he hoped to be able 
to put the case to the jury by May 1 because he would be 
presiding over a capital murder trial in early May. (Supp. 
App. G.) Accordingly, the court, with the consent of the 
parties, decided to place time limits on the questioning of 
witnesses. After the defense's direct examination of Evans 
(which took approximately 132 minutes), the judge asked 
Nicholas's counsel how long he would require for cross- 
examination. Counsel responded that he would need 75 
minutes; the District Court allowed him 90 minutes. 
Nicholas now argues that this time limit was inappropriate. 
 
If there was any error here, Nicholas has waived his right 
to object to it. Nicholas's counsel never objected at trial to 
the District Court's time limits, and indeed agreed to the 
90-minute time frame for Evans's cross-examination. 
Accordingly, we will not disturb the District Court's 
judgment on this ground. 
 
2. 
 
Nicholas attempted to call Dr. William Becker as a 
rebuttal witness to testify about certain events reflecting on 
the credibility and truthfulness of Evans. Specifically, 
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Nicholas sought to have Becker testify that Evans had 
previously submitted inaccurate information in a grant 
report to the United States government. The District Court 
excluded this testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 608(b). We review this evidentiary ruling for abuse 
of discretion, and will affirm. 
 
Under Rule 608(b), "specific instances of the conduct of 
a witness, other than conviction of crime as provided in 
Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence." Fed. R. 
Evid. 608(b). "Extrinsic evidence is evidence offered through 
other witnesses, rather than through cross-examination of 
the witness himself or herself. This court has construed 
Rule 608(b) as requiring the exclusion of extrinsic 
impeachment evidence concerning a witness's prior 
instances of conduct." United States v. McNeil, 887 F.2d 
448, 453 (3d Cir. 1989). Although Nicholas had the right to 
cross-examine Evans himself on relevant past incidents of 
untruthfulness, the District Court properly prohibited him 
from proving this collateral matter by extrinsic evidence. 
 
3. 
 
After the liability phase of the trial, defendants moved for 
discovery sanctions against Nicholas (or, in the alternative, 
for reopening of discovery) based on his failure to disclose 
the details of his post-termination employment. Specifically, 
Nicholas failed to reveal that Centre Emergency Medical 
Associates (CEMA), where he worked as a part-time 
emergency room doctor, had informed him that it planned 
to eliminate his position. The District Court granted the 
motion for sanctions and precluded Nicholas from 
introducing any evidence of future lost earnings at the 
damages phase. We review an order imposing discovery 
sanctions for abuse of discretion, see Konstantopoulos v. 
Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 719 (3d Cir. 1997), and will 
affirm. 
 
Here, the District Court based its ruling on Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(e), which provides that a party is 
"under a duty to supplement or correct the disclosure or 
response to include information thereafter required if . . . 
the party learns that in some material respect the 
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information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the 
additional or corrective information has not otherwise been 
made known to the other parties during the discovery 
process or in writing." Furthermore, under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), when "a party without substantial 
justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 
26(a) or 26(e)(1) [that party] shall not, unless such failure is 
harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at trial .. . any 
witness or information not so disclosed." In considering 
whether the exclusion of evidence is an appropriate 
sanction for failure to comply with discovery duties, we 
must consider four factors: (1) the prejudice or surprise of 
the party against whom the excluded evidence would have 
been admitted; (2) the ability of the party to cure that 
prejudice; (3) the extent to which allowing the evidence 
would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or 
other cases in the court; and (4) bad faith or wilfulness in 
failing to comply with a court order or discovery obligation. 
See Konstantopoulos, 112 F.3d at 719. 
 
Here, the District Court found that Nicholas knew as 
early as November 1997 that his position at CEMA would 
be eliminated, and that this information made his previous 
disclosure of continuing employment with CEMA materially 
inaccurate. The court further found that Nicholas, without 
justification, failed to disclose this new development to 
defendants until May 21, 1998, and did not provide them 
with the relevant documents until June 19, 1998--just one 
month before the beginning of the damages phase trial. 
(App. 595-96.) The court noted that this delay substantially 
prejudiced the defendants: 
 
       For example, if Nicholas seeks damages for future lost 
       wages because he is no longer employed by Centre 
       Emergency Medical Associates, the Defendants aver 
       that they will have to develop additional rebuttal 
       evidence as to the causes of Nicholas's termination by 
       Centre Emergency Medical Associates, the availability 
       of other positions to Nicholas, Nicholas's reasonable 
       attempts to mitigate his future damages and prepare 
       witness testimony including possible expert witness 
       testimony. 
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(App. 596.) Moreover, the court found that permitting the 
evidence would likely require a lengthy stay and disrupt the 
orderly conclusion of the trial, which was already in 
progress. Nicholas provides no coherent legal or factual 
argument controverting these findings. Consequently, we 
hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
imposing discovery sanctions. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we find no merit in any of Nicholas's allegations 
of error. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is 
affirmed. 
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